Introduction
The emergence and identification of the new media, premised upon the development and application of digital technologies, has created new sources and locations of power, many not fully documented or understood. Those medium) which arise from shifts in power. None of these problems is exclusive of the new media, though each emerges with interesting new features in this context. They are the problems of regulatory arbitrage, anonymity and scarcity of resources. In each case once prevalent governance forms based on public ownership are no longer fashionable (and for some no longer feasible) enhancing the urgency of investigating other forms of control. We should be clear that these are not the only problems associated with the new media. Among the other pressing policy problems are the issues relating to accessibility of digital broadcasting and communications services to less advantaged consumers (which can be defined both in economic and social terms) 14 and the extent to which content of digital broadcasting should be controlled (in the manner that both negative and positive content controls apply to analogue broadcasting). 15 Discussion of these issues is precluded for reasons of space and in the belief that the theoretical frame developed is sufficiently addressed by the policy problems which we do discuss.
The Regulatory Arbitrage Problem
The problem of regulatory arbitrage emerges wherever subjects of regulation have sufficient mobility in their operations or activities that they can choose to be regulated by one regime rather than another. The effect is to create a form of market for regulation within which dissatisfied subjects can 'exit' one regime in favour of another. Regulatory arbitrage, seen as a problem for authorities attempting to capture activities within their web, can also be seen as a solution to problems of excessive or inappropriate regulation as it limits the capacities of authorities. 16 The problem has an interesting double-edged character in the new media, since options to relocate to avoid particular regulatory regimes may be available both to service providers and consumers. Thus broadcasters can relocate their operations to different jurisdictions to evade national regulation (and this predates digitalisation) while listeners and viewers can relocate from the more controllable forms of delivery to satellite and Internet.
One of the problems raised by regulatory arbitrage is the risk that competing standards for the new digital broadcasting transmission services might develop. This is squarely addressed with harmonised rules requiring all member states to legislate for common standards in the EU, notably in respect of consumer equipment for conditional access to services. 17 Under the terms of European Union legislation the EU rules on broadcasting regulation apply only to broadcasters established in a state to which the applicable directive applies. 18 The directive's requirements that member states apply their domestic broadcasting rules to all broadcasters established within the state has been interpreted so as to require member states to apply their rules as intensely to broadcasters directing their programming at other member states. 19 This interpretation is intended to preclude countries like the UK establishing themselves as attractive locations for establishment of overseas broadcasters through the application of a more liberal regime than would apply to domestic broadcasters. 20 This is a particular issue with broadcasters seeking to evade what they regard as overly restrictive domestic rules, for example on advertising to children or transmission of pornography.
Regulatory arbitrage in Cyberspace (that is applying to the Internet) is a focal point for two opposing schools of thought, the Cyberlibertarians and the Cyber-paternalists. The primary argument of the Cyberlibertarians is that Cyberspace is unregulable due to its design.
Cyberspace is a unique jurisdiction as it has no physicality or real-world existence. It is possible to conceive of Internet users simultaneously in Cyberspace and in a grounded, realworld jurisdiction. 21 It is this duality and the non-physicality of Cyberspace which allows for regulatory arbitrage. In the physical world sovereignty is exercised by governments over defined physical territories. A user who wishes to be regulated by a different regulatory structure may take steps to relocate either themselves or their activities. In Cyberspace users may transcend physical borders with ease and may choose to take on any guise or form desired (see below 'The Anonymity Problem'). Users who prefer a regulated environment where there are structured discussions on carefully selected topics, and where content is closely monitored and censored may choose to join a regulated and monitored cybercommunity such as America Online (AOL). Users seeking uncensored discussion and complete freedom of speech may make use of a virtual chat room on the USENET system or may use an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to enter unmonitored discussion boards on the Web. These freedoms allow users to choose freely the regulatory structure they wish to follow while in Cyberspace. Thus a citizen of Germany can enter a USENET discussion group on the Holocaust and post denial messages, something he or she would be unable to do freely in their home state. Similarly a UK citizen may post information which is in breach of the Official Secrets Acts. Although strictly speaking these citizens are still committing offences within their physical jurisdiction, they can do so without fear of prosecution as in
Cyberspace they have taken on a different personality and thus are unlikely to be traced and prosecuted. 22 These citizens have effectively removed themselves from the regulatory control of their sovereign government and have chosen to be regulated by another set of regulatory values and norms. This is because, as dramatically put by David Post, 'Cyberspace…does not merely weaken the significance of physical location it destroys it….they do not cross geographical boundaries (in the way that say environmental pollution crosses geographical boundaries), they ignore the existence of boundaries altogether.'
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The Anonymity Problem
The non-physicality of Cyberspace allows Internet users to choose to adopt a different persona from their real-world personality (pseudonymity) or to hide all details of their personality (anonymity). Pseudonymity and anonymity provide a further set of problems for regulators. As well as facilitating regulatory arbitrage by allowing citizens to conceal their identity, thereby inhibiting the application of civil, administrative and criminal regimes while in Cyberspace, pseudonymity and anonymity also allow Netizens to carry out transactions in an unregulated manner. 24 Two examples which may be given are the distribution of hate or defamatory speech, and access to regulated content.
To begin with the latter, there are certain areas in our physical societies where we regulate access to certain persons. Children are not permitted access to public bars or licensed sex shops. In addition there are activities that are restricted to certain persons. Only those with driving licenses may legally drive and only those who are members of the appropriate 22 With a degree of computer literacy they can ensure that it would be almost impossible for law enforcement agencies in the physical world to track them down and prosecute. This is discussed further below at 000-000. 23 professional society may practice as a lawyer. A lack of physical persona makes the regulation of such simple activities much more complex in Cyberspace. A child may take on an adult personality and gain access to pornographic content. 25 In the physical world a child entering a licensed sex shop would be removed by the manager, whereas in Cyberspace the elements of physicality are lost and the ability to regulate is impaired. This is not to say the anonymity problem renders regulation of access impossible. Community-based control structures, supported by design-based elements have met with a high degree of success.
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More worryingly, the access control problem allows for the potentially more harmful conduct of adults passing themselves off as children. In the same way children are prevented from accessing certain adult areas of the physical world there are areas where unauthorised adults are kept out to protect children. 27 Children nowadays are educated to keep away from strangers and to be wary of any unusual adult contact. Again the lack of physicality in Cyberspace raises problems. Users cannot discern the age of others in the chatroom intended for children. As it is at the user's discretion how much information he wishes to reveal about himself there is no practical methodology to ensure adults do not pose as minors for as long as Cyberspace supports an anonymous culture. And given that any attempt to remove the currently available culture of pseudonymity/anonymity would probably lead to a high level of regulatory arbitrage there is no apparent means to deal with such problems.
Further, the easy availability of anonymous messaging allows individuals to take part in activities without being required to meet usual societal norms. Individuals may make antisocial comments without fear of being ostracised by society at large. 49 There is a paucity of such names as usable domain names are of a one mark one owner architecture whereas previous trade mark systems had been of a one mark many owners architecture.
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Competing demands for usable domain names quickly arose and the bodies charged with overseeing the domain name system (initially the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and Network Solutions Inc., and more latterly the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)) 51 were required to develop a policy to deal with these competing claims. This policy, the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, attempts to balance the rights of trade mark holders against the first-user policy previously applied. It is an extremely controversial policy and will be examined in depth below when we analyse the effectiveness of control mechanisms in the new media. separates the functions of a control system shows that the standard-setting element of architecture is not self-executing but is, by definition, designed by human hands. Some architecture-based regimes may be self executing as to monitoring and behaviour modification. A parking bollard, for example, requires no further agency on the part of a regulator to control parking. Other architectural controls do rely on actions by the controller.
For example, Betham's panopticon requires that prison guards actively monitor prisoners and intervene to control deviance. The panopticon can thus be seen as a hybrid of hierarchy and architecture.
The importance of Lessig's analysis is to draw attention to the variety of bases for control which can be deployed in the face of anxiety that technological change (such as the Internet) and economic change (such as globalisation) tends to make a variety of different forms of conduct unregulatable. The argument that variety in forms of activity requires an equal or greater variety of bases for control if regulation is to be effective has found formal expression in the cybernetics 'law of requisite variety'. It is expressed in other terms as the principle that 'only variety can destroy variety'. 57 The sceptical position which Lessig challenges is premised in part upon a myth that social and economic activity has traditionally been highly amenable to regulation, conventionally defined. Recent scholarship on the limits to control has emphasised the problems of trying to regulate social and economic activity. 58 This work has emphasised the importance of developing regulatory regimes which seek to steer or stimulate activities within the target system indirectly as an alternative to external command and control. 59 Lessig's work has the potential to support efforts to reconceive regulation in a sense that is both more modest in its claims and ambitions and more useful in providing mechanisms not only, or perhaps mainly, of direct control but also of indirect control. A key method of this new approach, which we deploy in this article, is to identify effective regulation in whatever form it takes and to seek to support it, develop it or extend it by analogy to other domains in which there are problems of regulation.
The concept of regulation deployed in Lessig's analysis is a broad one, extending beyond the narrowly defined 'systematic oversight by reference to rules' to encompass four 'modalities of regulation' which have the object or effect of holding behaviour within one state among the all the possible states which the behaviour might take. Lessig refers to the '"net regulation" of any particular policy…' domain as the 'sum of the regulatory effects of the four modalities together.' 60 Regulation in this expansive sense is conceptually closer to the usage of biologists and sociologists than to that of lawyers. 61 It refers to any control system.
To be viable, within the terms of control theory, a control system must have some standardsetting element, some means by which information about the operation of the system can be gathered, and some provision for modifying behaviour to bring it back within the acceptable limits of the system's standards. 62 With regulation information gathering is usually achieved through monitoring by an agency, department or self-regulatory body and deviations When locating Lessig's description within the stricter analysis of control theory some problems emerge both with the labels and the concepts which they describe. Put simply the conceptual schema, drawn from Lessig's work in law and economics, needs enriching if it is to capture the institutional variety in control. Our earlier discussion of control theory suggests that the appropriate schema involves not only a four way division between different bases of control, but also a further fine grained analysis of the three different elements necessary to generate a control system (standard-setting, information gathering and behaviour modification). This development of the analysis provides a clearer descriptive framework for understanding how control is or can be achieved and opens up the possibility for identifying the wide range of control systems which appear as hybrids of two or more modalities of regulation. To develop this analysis we draw not only on Lessig's work, but also on attempts to deploy cultural theory to identify variety in control systems. 63 This analytical frame has recently been put to work in analysing variety in risk regulation regimes. 64 The term 'regime' is apt to capture variety not only in standards and standard-setting (which represents the bias in Lessig's analysis) but also in the institutional dimensions of information gathering and behaviour modification. The regime analysis makes it transparent that the various functions which contribute to viable control systems can be widely dispersed among state and non-state actors, even within a single regime, and can be assembled in mixed or hybrid forms.
Lessig's conceptualisation of 'law as command' 65 suffers from a weakness in that it fails to capture all of the control systems which are within the set of command based or, as we label it, hierarchical control. Law, in this conception, refers only to state law (whether made by judges, or, more commonly in this context, legislatures) 66 and neglects the plurality of forms which hierarchical control structures may take. The richer conception of hierarchy looks to the form of control rather than its source. Thus the regime for developing Internet domain names has important elements which are non-state in character and yet which are distinctly hierarchical (and are discussed further below). The term law also suffers from the difficulty that it is often deployed in a way which infers only standards and not the institutional elements of a control system (viz information gathering and behaviour modification). Law in Lessig's terms is merely the constraint placed upon the individual. Accordingly hierarchical control provides both a better label and a substantively enriched conception of this modality of regulation.
The concept of norms as it is deployed in Lessig's analysis follows a usage developed in the social psychological literature -referring to shared patterns of behaviour -but which is unconventional and unhelpful in the study of law. Even in its psychological usage the term norm does not describe the institutional dimensions of a control system, but rather a set of standards which exist between a particular social group for the time being . We argue that the preferred meaning of the word norm is as the generic term for standards, guidelines and legal and non-legal rules. 67 The control form which involves societal or group standards, peerbased information gathering and behaviour modification based on social sanctions such as ostracisation or disapproval, we refer to as community-based control. This category includes not only the social norms which exist generally or between particular groups, but also some elements of more formalised regimes, as where self-regulatory standards are socially generated and written down and then combined in a hybrid form with hierarchical elements to created a self-regulatory control system which is a hybrid between community and hierarchical bases. of social and economic activity. Wherever it is deployed it has controlling effects and a potential for those controlling effects to be turned towards different or modified effects.
If each of the four pure bases of regulation is theoretically capable of being deployed on its own and with each of the other three bases (giving four single bases, six pairings, four threesomes and one foursome) then there are fifteen forms of regulation in total. There is no empty set since all domains are subject to some form of regulation (or else, by definition, they could not be a domain since they would not hold a recognisable shape). explaining relations of interdependence and thus how power is played out in particular social settings. 79 Similarly the effects of controls may vary depending on how they are perceived in the cognition of those whom they affect. Thus some individuals or societies may respond with resistance to controls which are met with compliance by others or at other times. Thus an analysis of modalities of regulation does not, by itself, provide a toolkit for decisions on the design of controls, but rather a more limited analytical understanding of controls which have been observed and might be deployed in certain environments and which might be expected to be effective under appropriate conditions.
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Putting Controls to Work
The importance of the reconfiguring and development of the modalities of regulation argument further extends to institutional choices for seeking to use controls for public policy objectives. Whereas Lessig places greater emphasis on top-down institutional approaches, of which regulatory agency forms represent the leading example, we contend that an emphasis on hybrid forms of control will tend to lead to the deployment of hierarchical controls as instruments to steer organic or bottom up developments, whether in the form of competition, community or design-based control. In some instances successful regimes have combined three or even all four of the bases for regulation.
Hierarchy/Community
Hierarchy and community-based controls are often combined either to ensure that industries effectively collaborate on controlling their sector or to give sectoral self-regulation greater 80 We are grateful to Julia Black for this point. 81 As discussed above ICANN controls the allocation of a scarce resource and therefore plays an important regulatory role.
predecessors, IANA and Network Solutions Inc., have long provided regulatory control over the domain name system but have done so not as a function of hierarchical control, but rather to assist in the development of the domain name system as required by the community and to ensure the system design remained intact. Their actions were, though more than socially unacceptable, they were also a threat to the developing architecture of the domain name system. By controlling domain names which reflected well known identifiers from the real world they posed a threat to the system. How could people navigate the Web if they couldn't rely on the knowledge they had developed in the physical world? 83 Although courts could intervene in cases where cybersquatters had misappropriated another's trade mark 84 regulatory arbitrage meant enforcement of orders could sometimes prove problematic.
What was required was a regulatory regime which would apply to all registrations and could be applied whatever the jurisdiction of the parties. This led directly to the first Network Solutions Inc Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, a policy which has now been adopted and refined by ICANN. The policy has proven successful as it treats the domain 82 Kleinwächter n 4 above, 271-272. 83 domain names from the majority it means market-based controls may be circumvented and a scarce and therefore valuable domain name may be had for as little as $25. This allows for a high degree of speculation in domain names.
The previous Network Solutions Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy required the complainer to obtain a court order. This meant it was in many cases cheaper to buy the disputed domain name from the defender than to pursue an action to recover the name, especially if the dispute had an international element. The present ICANN Uniform DomainName Dispute-Resolution Policy, through its use of inexpensive arbitration procedures provides a regulatory process which takes account of market conditions. This is not to say that the policy is not without its critics. There is strong criticism of the ICANN policy on the grounds that it now favours trade mark holders over domain name holders who fail, for whatever reason to comply with US trademark law. 86 This has led to a practice known as 'Reverse Domain Name Hijacking' occurring. 87 This is a potential flaw in the ICANN policy.
As discussed the policy was originally introduced to deal with cybersquatters who were perceived as a socially unacceptable and a potential threat to continued utility of the 85 The UK raised US$35.4 bn by auctioning 5 UMTS spectrum licences, while Germany raised $46.1bn by auctioning twelve spectrum blocks. In both cases the number of interested bidders exceeded the number of licences available creating a scarcity of resources. This may be contrasted with the position in the Netherlands where the auctioning of five licences was met with five serious bidders and raised only $2.5 bn or in Italy where a similar situation to the Netherlands saw the Italian Government raise only $10 bn. 86 architecture of the domain name system. The policy now needs to develop to provide more balanced approach between the competing interests of parties. Fortunately there is evidence that the arbiters under the policy may be developing such a mature and balanced approach.
There were some initial claims that the policy was being used to restrict free speech.
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Recently though, decisions of the arbitration panels have shown the policy has a degree of flexibility which may allow them to develop the policy to meet the demands of the community at large. 89 Clearly the regulatory authority was implementing a hierarchical control system to support the development of community-based and design-based controls.
Hierarchy/Competition
The combination of hierarchical with competition based controls is well established in the media and communications sectors. Thus regimes which apply economic or content controls more intensely to some firms than to others effectively create a continuum within which firms exerting dominance are often located closer to the hierarchy end while smaller and/or less powerful firms are located towards the market end. Within the 'responsive regulation' theory this approach is labelled 'partial industry regulation'. 90 The logic of the approach is that the benefits sought for regulation may be secured less intrusively by applying regulation only to a proportion of the firms, whilst creating space for other firms to be controlled more by market elements. Typical patterns of more intense regulation of broadcast over print media are said to have reduced risks of censorship and promoted pluralism. 91 In the telecommunications sector 'asymmetric regulation' has been deployed to provide tighter controls over dominant incumbents both to maintain service levels and to promote access to the market by new entrants. 92 With the new media other forms of control which mix hierarchy and competition have been developed. 88 These claims are based in the so-called 'sucks' cases. Domains such as directlinesucks.com (D2000-0583) and freeservesucks.com (D2000-0585) were transferred to the trade marks holders following arbitration. Claims followed that decisions such as these were restricting free speech. 89 Three recent decisions wallmartcanadasucks.com (D2000-1104), lockheedmartinsucks.com (D2000-1015) and michaelbloombergsucks.com (FA0097077) have all found in favour of the respondent. Cynical accounts claim that the decision to charge was premised upon the greed of finance ministries. But there is a more principled explanation for the policy which is posited as a solution to one of the key problems of scarcity -that governments may fail to allocate scarce resources to those who are best able to exploit them to the general benefit.
The conventional instrument for the allocation of scarce spectrum is the exercise of government's hierarchical authority to examine potential applicants and make a decision along the lines of a 'beauty contest'. 94 This method was used in eight of the Member States.
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The weakness of this method is said to lie in its dependence on the knowledge and judgement of the applicable state bureaucracy both to guess the appropriate fee to charge successful applicants and which applicants are best placed to exploit the spectrum. This 'limited knowledge' problem is perhaps more acute in the 3G mobile sector where there is little consensus on the commercial prospects for services which are made possible in the digital environment but which have not yet been tested in the market place.
The alternative method for allocating spectrum used in the remainder of the member states was to auction the licences, combining hierarchy with competition as the basis of control.
Deviating from the sealed bid method used in previous spectrum auctions, the UK government and others decided to use a transparent (ie no sealed bids) simultaneous multi- round ascending auction under which bidders' offers would be revealed at the end of each round and whoever held the highest bid when the number of bidders was reduced to equal the number of licences would win the particular licence. In this way the price mechanism is used to determine which firms should have access to the scare resource controlled by government.
The outcome of the UK auction was that payments for licences totalling 22 billion pounds were much higher than was expected by commentators and government. 96 Details of auction rules and incentives resulted in less successful outcomes in some other member states. 97 The UK experience initially suggested the auction had been successful in revealing a true value of the licences well above government estimates. Commentators still do not agree on whether the high cost of licences, particularly in the UK and Germany, will stifle the market as operators struggle to repay the cost. 98 The German regulator has already indicated that it may allow the operators to share infrastructure costs and the same thing may happen in the UK.
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This divergence between the actual operating conditions (and reduction in costs) over those projected at the time of the auctions suggests that the injection of competition in the licence allocation process has generally been less than successful.
With the problem of regulatory arbitrage the solutions are often put in terms of regulatory competition or coordination. In other words arbitrage may be overcome by providing coordinated or harmonised rules across jurisdictions or arbitrage itself may seen as a solution to the problem of excessive regulation. Regulatory harmonisation was for a long time the favoured way of providing a level playing field for competition in the internal market of the EU. However, this exercise of hierarchical authority raises practical difficulties in terms of the scale of resource necessary to achieve it, and is said to risk stultifying the very markets which are to be liberalised. A partial response to the practical problems of harmonisation was the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Cassis de Dijon case which gave judicial authority to a principle of mutual recognition. 100 Regulatory competition is said to provide the flexibility for jurisdictions to develop standards to match the local requirements (whether technical or political), the capacity to innovate in regulation while encouraging states to adopt rules of minimum necessary burden on business or others (because of the threat that such regulatory clients might shift their business elsewhere). A recent analysis suggests that the choice between competition and coordination is a false one both in practice and normatively and that what we are likely to see is elements of competition (for example between institutions) emerging in domains that are notionally coordinated and vice-versa. Thus it is better to talk of 'regulatory co-opetition', a hierarchy/community hybrid form of control, both as description of the phenomena and as normative aspiration.
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Regulatory arbitrage is a well recognised phenomenon of Cyberspace, though commentators reach different conclusions as to its significance. 
Hierarchy, Competition and Design
In addition to the use of hierarchical/community controls discussed earlier, ICANN is also applying a design/competition-based hybrid in an attempt to alleviate the pressure on the domain name system. As domain names are a man made rather than natural phenomenon they do not have to be rationed in the manner of natural resources such as bandwidth. 106 Lessig offers an alternative solution to the problem of undersupply of bandwidth. Although acknowledging supply of radiocommunications bandwidth is naturally limited he suggests we are extremely wasteful of the resource available. He rejects the use of beauty contests or auctions to propertise bandwidth as outlined above and suggests instead a design solution allowing a more efficient use of bandwidth as a free or common resource. Lessig, n 1 above, chapter 12.
specialised domains, demand will be lowered in the oversubscribed .com domain and a solution will be found to the scarcity problem. There has been profound disquiet about 
Other Forms of Control
The emphasis of current thinking on alternatives to hierarchical control is largely focused on linking hierarchy to competition or to community-based methods of control. This focus largely excludes two major classes of forms of control, one defined in terms of excluding hierarchy and the other defined in terms of including design.
Design-Based Regulation
A key example which is located in both sets (employing design and excluding hierarchy) is the use of regional management codes by DVD producers and equipment manufacturers.
Producers and equipment manufacturers have collaborated in a regional coding system which allows for market segmentation within the DVD industry. Regional coding was developed to permit studios to control the home release of movies within different geographical regions allowing the staggering of cinematic releases. 109 The studios required that DVD software codes included a simple code that could be used to prevent playback of certain discs in certain geographical regions. The equipment manufacturers assisted by producing region specific DVD players, each player being given a code for the region in which it is sold. The player will refuse to play discs that are not encoded for that region. This means that discs bought in one country may not play on players bought in another country. The addition of regional management codes are entirely optional for the maker of a disc, discs without codes will play on any player in any country. These codes should not be confused with the DVD Content Scramble System, discussed below, which acts as a copy-control measure. Regional management codes are not an encryption system, they are merely one byte of information on the disc, which denotes one of eight different DVD regions. 110 Thus an encoded DVD bought in the US will not be viewable on a European DVD player. There is no hierarchical element to this. Customers are not prevented by contract or any other laws from buying DVDs in other countries. The control is effected by features of the diverse product standards which make a DVD useless when paired with a player with a different coding.
Including Design
A related example is the use of a hierarchy/design hybrid in an attempt to manage the high levels of digital piracy which occur on the Web. Matsushita Electric and Toshiba, for the motion picture industry and was adopted as industry standard in 1996. The system involves a dual key encryption system which encrypts all sound and graphic files contained on a DVD release. The files may be decrypted by the appropriate decryption algorithm which is made up of a series of keys stored on both the DVD and the DVD player. This means that only players and discs containing the appropriate keys may decrypt the necessary files and play the movies stored on the DVDs. 114 The CSS system did not directly prevent direct copying of DVD discs, the contents of a DVD (while encrypted) could be copied directly from one DVD to another. CSS did though prevent the uploading of the contents of a DVD on to hard disc or a web server. The concern of some users was that whether they wish to rely on a hierarchy/design hybrid or a community/design hybrid.
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Excluding Hierarchy
A successful example of a community using design tools to effect a regulatory scheme is the community-based approach to protecting children in Cyberspace. As discussed above the anonymity problem raises two distinct dangers for minors in Cyberspace. One is that they gain access to materials which are unsuitable for minors and the other is that adults take advantage of anonymity to forge improper relationships with minors. Hierarchical controls fail to remedy these problems but a community-based solution has proved extremely successful, especially when linked with design-based solutions. Within organised cybercommunities children may be supervised by the community. Communities such as AOL encourage family membership where parents register the details of the family as a whole and each individual member has their own password. Unless the child were to compromise an adult password, their status can therefore be made known to the community and the community can supervise and protect the child while he is online. Children cannot be watched all the time and the community cannot take over all parenting responsibilities. To assist, additional design based tools may be used. In addition to the community supervision, parents may employ software solutions such as CYBERsitter and Net Nanny. These products allow parents to set acceptable parameters for their children when in Cyberspace.
121 120 See further Lessig, n 1 above, chapter 11. 121 Such software programs are called alternatively Filterware or Censorware (depending very much upon your political viewpoint). Many programs such as the ones listed use stand-alone value judgements to categorise Web sites based on their content. The software provider will review sites and will put them on either an 'allowed' or a 'not allowed' list. Other programs rely upon the Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) a standardised industry system which allows content to be rated in various categories including: topics such as 'sexual content', 'race', and 'privacy', under the control of the user.
Combined, the role of the community and the security provided by these products appear to provide a relatively successful solution to the access problem.
Conclusions
New and unpredictable configurations of power are among the hallmarks of the new media. It is not surprising that the problem of control has attracted such a high degree of interest among scholars. Not only are there interesting problems of designing regimes to provide appropriate constraints on undesirable activities, there are also challenges in securing the maximum benefit to the community of new technologies such as the Internet and 3G mobile (each of which is said to be subject to 'network effects' such that the more users there the greater the benefit to the community generally). The new media phenomena present scholars with at least two temptations. One is to overstate the novelty of the problems presented, with a consequent tendency to reject 'old' forms of control. 122 The second is to overstate the extent to which the media themselves 'hardwire' or constrain the possible means to addressing the problems. Both tendencies are prevalent in analyses of the control problem as it applies to the Internet.
The alternative, which we have argued for, is to locate problems of controlling the new media squarely within well established analyses of problems of regulatory control. Such analysis encourages us to look at the mechanisms of control which already subsist within the target system and to find ways to stimulate or steer those indigenous mechanisms towards meeting the public interest objectives of regulation. Thus a central role for hierarchy is to steer systems which involve other forms of control based in community, market or design (or combination thereof). This does not exclude the possibility that effective control may occur through competition, design or community, together or separately, without hierarchical involvement.
A key challenge presented by such novel governance mechanisms is how to deploy them in such a way that are perceived as legitimate. 
